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CLIMATE EXACTIONS 
J. PETER BYRNE∗ & KATHRYN A. ZYLA∗∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Governments at every level need to devise innovative approaches to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in order to lessen global warming 
already underway.  They also need to fashion measures to help adapt to the 
inevitable and alarming environmental effects.  Efforts are underway at the 
federal and state levels to reduce emissions from large stationary sources 
and from vehicles, and to plan for climate adaptation.  However, these 
efforts will have little impact on land use development patterns, which drive 
transportation choices and reshape natural systems.  These patterns are 
regulated primarily by local planning decisions, which have not historically 
addressed greenhouse gas emissions or adaptation challenges.  However, 
local governments have significant experience using land use tools to 
mitigate other development impacts, including those on environmental 
resources. 
Monetary exactions are one such common tool that can force 
developers to mitigate the climate costs of new development.  Local 
governments commonly impose fees, a type of monetary exaction, on new 
development to offset public costs that such development will impose.  This 
Essay argues that monetary fees offer significant potential as a tool to help 
local governments manage land development’s contribution to climate 
change.  Such “climate exactions” can put a price on the carbon emissions 
from new development and also on development that reduces the natural 
resiliency of the jurisdiction to the effects of climate change, such as sea-
level rise.  Thus, for example, a town might permit development of 
residences in a location distant from the town center and not served by 
public transit, but charge a monetary fee based on anticipated automobile 
emissions.  Analogously, if  a state agency predicts that the location of the 
development will become a wetland due to sea-level rise in the future, the 
town could charge an additional fee based on probable loss of future 
wetlands.  While no jurisdiction has yet imposed exactions explicitly to 
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address such climate problems, the strategy is commonly used to address a 
variety of other negative externalities and public services needs and 
provides a promising legal template for climate concerns. 
In addition to describing how such climate exactions might work, the 
Essay argues that using exactions to address climate concerns is consistent 
with the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional takings framework, 
including the Court’s recent exactions decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Management District.1  The Essay also argues that exactions are an 
appropriate and feasible approach for local governments in our federal 
system.2  It suggests that California provides an especially inviting legal 
context for local governments to experiment with climate exactions.3 
II.  WHY “CLIMATE EXACTIONS”? 
As demonstrated by the global climate agreement negotiated in Paris 
in December 2015,4 the urgent need to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases contributing to climate change is widely understood.  In the United 
States, climate change is expected to cause increased water scarcity, more 
frequent and intensive heat waves, particularly in cities, sea-level rise and 
storm surges threatening coastal homes and infrastructure, and other 
impacts.5  Many of these changes are beginning already, and they are 
expected to become worse over time.6  Emissions of greenhouse gases 
produced by the burning of fossil fuels—for example, in our power plants, 
factories, vehicles, and homes—are the primary contributors to climate 
change.7  Although communities will inevitably have to develop strategies 
to deal with unavoidable climate impacts, it is equally important to lessen 
these impacts by reducing the emissions driving them. 
Many national and state efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions focus on the power sector (for example, the Clean Power Plan, 
finalized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in June 20158), a 
logical place to start given the sector’s large contribution to CO2 
                                                          
 1.  133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).  See infra Part II. 
 2.  See infra Part V.  
 3.  See infra Part VI.  
 4.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Negotiation Updates COP 
21/CMP 11, http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/in-session/items/9320.php (lasted visited 
Dec. 12, 2015). 
 5.  U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES: HIGHLIGHTS 7–9, 14–16 (2009), 
http://data.globalchange.gov/assets/4e/16/df9a1659784131dcd1ea020bce19/20page-highlights-
brochure.pdf.  
 6.  Id. at 8–11. 
 7.  Id. at 6. 
 8.  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
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emissions,9 relatively few sources, and the well-established regulatory 
system under which power companies already operate.  However, emissions 
from transportation make up thirty-three percent of CO2 emissions 
nationally and are growing.10 Policies must also address this much more 
diffuse source of emissions.11 
While many efforts to reduce transportation emissions focus on 
vehicle technology (e.g., vehicle fuel economy and GHG standards issued 
by EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 201012) 
and fuel content, less emphasis has been placed on the role of land 
development in emissions reduction policy.  Yet land use drives decisions 
about where people travel, how far, and by what mode, and therefore has a 
significant effect on transportation emissions.  Low density development 
with rigid zoning restrictions, better known as “sprawl,” needs to be 
severely restricted to reduce emissions.13  A 2009 study found that 
aggressively implementing a full range of strategies aimed at reducing 
vehicle miles traveled could reduce on-road GHG emissions by eighteen to 
twenty-four percent by 2050, and many of these strategies (e.g., expanded 
transit service, investments in land use) are in the hands of local planners 
and policymakers.14 
Development not only contributes to GHG emissions, but also affects 
the land’s ability to respond to the impacts of climate change.  For example, 
engineered structures like sea walls can damage beaches and wetlands; 
encourage even greater development behind the wall, leading to increased 
risks of catastrophic failure; and increase flooding and erosion of 
neighboring properties, all of which decrease the community’s ability to 
respond effectively to rising sea levels.15  If we are to be successful in 
addressing development’s role in climate change, we will have to address 
both its contributions to emissions and its effect on climate resilience. 
                                                          
 9.  U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report: 1990–2013, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 
11, 2015), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html.  
 10.  Vicki Arroyo & Kathryn A. Zyla, Transportation Policy, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH 303 (Barry S. Levy & Jonathan A. Patz eds., 2015). 
 11.  See generally id. at 303–13.  
 12.  Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25, 324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49 
C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38). 
 13.  Peter Calthorpe presents an excellent planning study of how promoting walkable, mixed-
use communities linked in regional transportation systems can effectively address climate change 
in Urbanism in the Age of Climate Change.  PETER CALTHORPE, URBANISM IN THE AGE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2011).  He makes a strong case that such urbanism is “our single most potent 
weapon against climate change, rising energy costs, and environmental degradation.”  Id. at 17. 
 14.  CAMBRIDGE SYSTEMATICS, INC., MOVING COOLER: AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORTATION 
STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2009), 
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/MovingCoolerExecSummaryULI.pdf. 
 15.  JESSICA GRANNIS, ADAPTATION TOOL KIT: SEA-LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL LAND USE 6 
(2011). 
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While much is being done at the federal and state levels to reduce 
emissions from large stationary sources16 and from vehicles,17 these 
strategies will have little impact on the land use patterns that drive 
transportation decisions.  Rather, local policies and planning decisions, 
which have not historically taken on GHG emissions explicitly, influence 
these patterns.  Local governments oversee land use decisions and build and 
maintain roads, transit systems, bicycle paths, and sidewalks.  They 
influence not only where people travel, but also how they travel, and for 
how long.18  In addition, while stationary sources like power plants are 
already part of an existing national regulatory regime for air emissions and 
other pollutants, it is much harder to get a handle on emissions from many 
small, distributed sources of emissions like buildings and transportation, 
and much harder to address these sources at a national (or even state) level.  
Local governments hold the levers needed to shift development to lower 
emission practices, and can do so in a way that makes sense within the 
context of their own jurisdictions. 
Local governments have significant experience employing land use 
tools to mitigate other impacts, including environmental concerns.19  In 
1926, the Supreme Court blessed the use of zoning by local governments in 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,20 concluding that the strategy is a 
reasonable extension of local police power.21  Local jurisdictions now 
regularly use zoning to minimize environmental harms and other negative 
impacts of development.  Over time, they have added to this toolkit, 
developing strategies like exactions of land or money, and planned unit 
developments to provide communities with a greater ability to manage and 
mitigate the impacts of land use in their neighborhoods.  Local governments 
therefore have the opportunity, the legal authority, and access to the tools 
needed to drive emissions reductions from development and protect the 
adaptive capacity of land in a way that other levels of government do not. 
There are well-known challenges with local decisionmaking, however.  
For example, competition among jurisdictions for new development and 
economic growth could lead to more lax environmental standards.22  For 
this reason and others, there are still important roles for state, regional, and 
                                                          
 16.  See, e.g., Clean Power Plan: What EPA is Doing, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 17, 
2015), http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/what-epa-doing. 
 17.  See, e.g., Cars and Light Trucks: Vehicle Standards and Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/standards.htm.  
 18.  See CALTHORPE, supra note 13, 22–23. 
 19.  See generally JOHN R. NOLON, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE 
LAW: STANDING GROUND (2014).  
 20.  272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 21.  Id. at 397.  
 22.  See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Local Climate Change Law, in LOCAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER LOCALITIES 3, 16 
(Benjamin J. Richardson ed., 2012). 
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national policies that address climate change.23  However, these regional 
and state-level efforts do not change the unique role that local government 
plays in driving development choices. 
Many local governments have already taken climate change on as an 
issue of local significance.  Sixty-six U.S. cities have signed onto the 
Compact of Mayors’ 2014 agreement24 to reduce city-level emissions and 
vulnerability to climate change25 and countless jurisdictions across the 
country have developed climate action plans, adaptation plans, or both.26  
These jurisdictions have committed to using the tools at their disposal to 
address climate change. 
As local governments contemplate the risks posed by climate change, 
many may want to take vigorous regulatory action to reduce emissions or 
avoid losses from consequent sea-level rise or storm surges.27  The most 
direct regulatory approach would be to prohibit new development that 
increases emissions or lessens the capacity of the community to adapt to the 
effects of climate change.  Thus, for example, a local government might 
prohibit development in areas not served by public transit in order to limit 
emissions from new automobile traffic, or in areas reasonably predicted to 
be submerged by rising seas during the expected useful life of the 
development.  While arguably effective to meet their public goals, such 
measures raise serious distributional concerns.  They could render land 
previously planned for development valueless or nearly so.  Affected 
private owners could be expected to wage vigorous political opposition to 
protect their interests, and other citizens may see the regulatory “wipeouts” 
of such investments as unfair.  Moreover, a jurisdiction may not have 
sufficient growth capacity in areas either walkable or served by transit nor 
the resources to expand low-carbon transit infrastructure. 
                                                          
 23.  See Alice Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, 39 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 390 (2014); see also William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and 
the Problem of Institutional Competence, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1999).  
 24.  Cities Committed to the Compact of Mayors, COMPACT OF MAYORS, 
http://compactofmayors.org/cities/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 25.  Compact of Mayors, ICLEI LOCAL GOV’TS FOR SUSTAINABILITY, 
http://www.iclei.org/compactofmayors.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).  
 26.  See, e.g., Climate Action Plans: Local Examples, INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, 
http://www.ca-ilg.org/post/climate-action-plans-local-examples (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); 
Example City Climate Plans, SUSTAINABLE REVOLUTION LONGMONT, 
http://www.srlongmont.org/examples-of-city-climate-action-plans.html (last visited Dec. 15, 
2015); State and Local Adaptation Plans, GEO. CLIMATE CTR., 
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/state-and-local-plans (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).  
 27.  On land use tools for addressing sea-level rise caused by climate change, see J. Peter 
Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 267–306 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012).  
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Such starkly prohibitive measures also may expose the local 
government to liability for a regulatory taking.28  The Supreme Court 
construes the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to require the 
government to pay “just compensation” not just when it expropriates or 
physically occupies land but also when regulations of use go “too far.”29  
Although many elements of the doctrine developed under this construction 
are confusing and inconsistent, it is reasonably clear that sudden changes in 
land use regulation that impose large losses on a small number of property 
owners are at risk of being judged to be regulatory takings.30  Indeed, in 
what might be considered the first sea-level rise takings case, involving the 
South Carolina Coastal Council’s prohibition of new construction seaward 
of an erosion line, the Supreme Court invented a new rule providing that 
when a regulation eliminates all economic value from a parcel of land, it 
will be deemed a regulatory taking without any consideration of the public 
justification for such a regulation.31 
The costs of litigating regulatory takings claims, let alone paying large 
compensation awards, are daunting for local governments, and lawyers for 
property owners are well aware of this vulnerability.  For these reasons, 
land use regulators have sought other means to discourage new 
developments that will exacerbate climate problems.32  One promising 
approach that has not yet been applied to carbon emissions or adaptation is 
the use of monetary exactions.  Climate exactions could condition new 
development upon payment for its impact on greenhouse gas emissions or 
                                                          
 28.  Takings problems arising from regulatory efforts to adapt to climate change are discussed 
in J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. 
REV. 69 (2012); see also James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: 
How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279 
(1998).  
 29.  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  
 30.  “In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s decisions have 
identified several factors that have particular significance.  The economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.”  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1165, 1229–34 (1967). 
 31.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1027 (1992).  
 32.  Perhaps the most ambitious legislative effort specifically to address reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions from land use planning has been California’s Sustainable Communities 
and Climate Protection Act, often referred to as S.B. 375.  2008 Cal. Stat. 5065 (codified in 
scattered sections of CAL. GOVT. CODE and PUB. RES. CODE).  The Act requires regional 
transportation plans to address how future transportation investment can help meet greenhouse gas 
emissions targets and provides incentives for localities to plan and zone for new development 
consistent with these goals.  The Act combines ambitious goals, complex interactions among 
multiple state agencies and local governments, and incentives with uncertain force.  See Dorothy 
J. Glancy, Vehicle Miles Travelled and Sustainable Communities, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23 
(2014); Alexandra Lampert, California’s Fight Against Global Warming: Finally Getting Smart 
About Sprawl?, 20 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 193 (2009).  
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the jurisdiction’s resilience to the impacts of climate change, and the funds 
used to mitigate the impact.  For example, the granting of a permit for 
development of land that lacks a public transit connection could be 
conditioned on the payment reflecting the social costs of the carbon that 
would be emitted from the automobiles of the residents; the proceeds could 
be used to support low-carbon transit options in other parts of the 
jurisdiction. 
An exaction can be understood as a required conveyance to the 
government of money or real property in exchange for the grant of a 
discretionary development permit.33  The justification for the exaction is 
that the government can and will use the property to mitigate some public 
harm from the proposed development.  The use of exactions in the land 
development process dates back to at least the 1950s when local 
governments required developers to donate roads within subdivisions in 
exchange for approval of the subdivision plat.34  Exactions became far more 
common during the 1960s and 1970s, as discretionary permitting grew to 
address public concerns about suburban growth, property taxes, and 
environmental harms.35  Today, despite decades of scholarly criticism,36 
exactions are a ubiquitous feature of the development process, requiring 
conveyances or fees to remedy increased traffic, overburdened schools and 
parks, and a growing lack of affordable housing, among myriad other 
needs.  Exactions permit developments to go forward despite their 
generation of public harms because they provide the means to mitigate 
those harms. 
The law governing exactions has grown throughout this period to 
reach a current state of maturity.  Early state court cases focused on the 
power of local governments to require exactions without explicit state 
delegations of authority.37  As regulatory tools, exactions need to address 
solely the effects on the public of granting the permit, rather than merely 
raise revenue for general public needs.  As a consequence, local 
governments have to show that the exactions will address some harm 
reasonably attributable to the permitted development.  State courts 
                                                          
 33.  See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the 
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 623–24 (2004).  
 34.  See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community 
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (1987).  
 35.  See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: 
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177 (2006).  
 36.  See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 465–67, 510 (1977) (criticizing exactions as unfair and inefficient 
burdens imposed by cartels of current homeowners). 
 37.  See, e.g., Ayers v. City Council of L.A., 207 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1949); Call v. City of West 
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218–19 (Utah 1979). 
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developed doctrine through the 1980s that implemented this requirement 
with varying degrees of strictness.38 
The United States Supreme Court subsequently entered the field in the 
well-known Nollan v. California Coastal Commission39 and Dolan v. City 
of Tigard40 decisions.  These cases fashioned a federal constitutional floor 
for exactions, requiring that every exaction have an “essential nexus” with a 
public harm justifying regulation41 and that the value of the property 
exacted be “roughly proportional” to the degree of harm threatened by the 
proposed development.42  These decisions rejected more easygoing 
approaches to evaluating exactions used by some state courts and limited 
the flexibility in bargaining between local regulators and developers.43  But 
they also had the effect of cementing the appropriateness of exactions for 
many public harms resulting from development, so long as the nexus and 
proportionality requirements were met.  Thus, the two cases taken together 
approved the use of exactions to address the impairment of public 
viewsheds, increased vehicular traffic, and additional runoff into a stream 
from paving adjacent land. 
Monetary exactions have become a particularly important form of 
exaction.  Rather than conveying to the government an interest in real 
property, the developer pays the government an equivalent in money, which 
the government then spends to mitigate the public harm attributable to the 
development.44  Monetary exactions, or “development impact fees,” have 
grown in prominence because they offer distinct advantages over “in kind” 
exactions both to government and to developers.45  Exactions of real 
property may come in parcels that are too awkwardly sized or located to 
address legitimate needs.  Impact fees can be assessed for a wider range of 
community needs than can land exactions, and the proceeds can be pooled 
and applied more easily to off-site community needs generated by the new 
development.  Thus, impact fees play a role in financing new capital 
                                                          
 38.  Compare Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E. 2d 799 (Ill. 1961) 
(strict test for reasonableness) with Assoc. Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 
(Cal. 1971) (lenient test for reasonableness).  
 39.  483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 40.  512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 41.  Id. at 386; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 42.  Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 43.  See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 
75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997).  
 44.  Monetary exactions as regulatory tools to mitigate specific harms can be distinguished 
from taxes designed primarily to raise general revenue even though taxes may be adopted with 
specific incentive effects.  See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 
1355 (Cal. 1997). 
 45.  See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS. E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 
AND DEVELOPMENT LAW 318–21 (3d ed. 2013).  
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expenditures necessitated by growth.46  For example, a large new residential 
subdivision may necessitate that the local public school add new classroom 
space, but the proposed subdivision may not attract enough families with 
children to justify a new building or even a new room, and the developer 
may not own land in an appropriate location or have the capacity to 
construct school space.  But, accepted formulas exist to project the number 
of school-age children likely to reside in a new development of a certain 
size and form, and the capital costs to accommodate them in local schools.47  
Thus, the developer could pay a monetary exaction based on a per pupil 
capital charge that reasonably and efficiently discharges its obligation while 
affording the local government flexibility in constructing new classroom 
space in what it deems the best location, design, and schedule.48 
An important safeguard is that the funds collected must be segregated 
in an account that may be used only to mitigate the harm for which the 
money was exacted.49  Many jurisdictions have legislated schedules of 
impact fees, which provide generally applicable formulas or tables of 
monetary charges for specific types and scales of development in place of 
case-by-case negotiations.50  Developers may prefer monetary exactions, 
and legislative development fees in particular, to in-kind exactions as being 
more predictable and transparent. 
Until recently, monetary exactions or impact fees offered local 
governments another advantage over in-kind exactions: it was unclear 
whether the Nollan/Dolan requirements of nexus and proportionality 
applied to monetary exactions.  Some courts had held that the constitutional 
requirements did not apply to monetary exactions, relieving the affected 
local governments from litigation risk.51  However, in Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Management District, the Supreme Court squarely held that the 
general constitutional test for exactions applies to monetary exactions as 
well.52 
                                                          
 46.  See id.; Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 203–04.  
 47.  See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls. 137 N.W. 2d 442, 449–50 (Wis. 1965). 
 48.  See, e.g., St, John’s County v. Ne. Fla. Builders Ass’n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635, 637, 639 
(Fla. 1991).   
 49.  See, Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 228. 
 50.  See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 45, at 319–22.   
 51.  See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1229 (Fla. 2011), 
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (collecting cases).  
 52.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013).  Koontz did 
not address whether the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan applies to legislatively scheduled 
impact fees.  Some state courts have held that such pre-established fees do not require such 
scrutiny because they are not bargained for and thus are less subject to the risk of “extortion.”  
See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996); 
Homebuilders Ass’n of Central Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. App. 1995), 
aff’d, 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1120 (1997).  The analysis in this Essay 
assumes that Nollan/Dolan will apply to climate exactions.  
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Koontz did not change the substance of the Court’s test for exactions.  
When challenged, local governments need only show that the monetary 
exactions they have demanded bear an essential nexus to the grounds for 
regulation and that the money sought is roughly proportional to the harm 
predicted from the development.  The Court’s opinion justifies its 
application to exactions of money on the reasonable concern that regulators 
can too easily evade Nollan and Dolan by obtaining money in place of an 
interest in real property.53  But the Court did not suggest any increase in the 
burden on local governments in meeting those requirements.  Importantly, 
Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court affirms the value of exactions more 
forcefully than any prior Court opinion.  The opinion expressly stated, 
“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their 
conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long 
sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.”54  The Court 
reiterated its concern about what it had termed “extortion” in prior cases, 
explaining that its concern focused on the ability of government to leverage 
its control over discretionary permits to obtain property unrelated to 
legitimate concerns about public harms attributable to the new 
development.55  Reiterating that regulators can insist that “applicants bear 
the full costs of their proposals,” the Court concluded:  “Under Nollan and 
Dolan the government may choose whether and how a permit applicant is 
required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development, but it may not 
leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends 
that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.”56 
Koontz has been the subject of some withering scholarly criticism as 
an undue and vague extension of the Court’s prior exactions doctrine.57  
Although some of that criticism seems warranted, this Essay will argue that 
Koontz does not pose a significant barrier to the use of climate exactions.  
The most problematic part of the Court’s opinion addresses the extension of 
Nollan and Dolan to “demands” for exactions that arise in negotiations 
between regulators and developers but are never made explicit conditions 
for the grant of permit.58  Both the reach and rationale for this extension 
seem problematic.59  But that holding poses no special risk for climate 
                                                          
 53.  Id. at 2598–99. 
 54.  Id. at 2595. 
 55.  Id. at 2594–95. 
 56.  Id. at 2595. 
 57.  See John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014); Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. 
REV. 287 (2014).  
 58.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.  
 59.  The Court declined to determine whether the discussions between the government and 
Koontz reached the level of a “demand” for payment, potentially exposing all sorts of negotiations 
to exactions analysis.  Local governments may want to structure their exactions process in order to 
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exactions.  Rather, climate exactions fall squarely within the Court’s 
approval of monetary exactions that mitigate public harms.60  They can be 
structured to avoid the undue “leverage” that the Court identified as the 
rights violation it acted to prevent, and also to operate with transparency.  
Indeed, as this Essay will show, climate exactions can be assessed 
following established formulas that provide objective calculation of 
proportionality. 
III.  APPLYING A “CLIMATE EXACTION” 
It is helpful to consider how a climate exaction might work in practice 
and how well these strategies would stand up to the Nollan and Dolan tests.  
This Section will suggest ways in which exactions might be used to address 
both emissions and loss of adaptive capacity caused by development. 
A.  Climate Exactions to Address GHG Emissions 
In the emissions context, developers of large new residential and 
commercial buildings might be charged a climate exaction based on the 
calculated “emissions impact” of the development.  For example, the 
development may be found to generate substantial new automobile travel and 
therefore increased emissions from driving, or to consume significant 
amounts of electricity on-site, leading to increased energy-sector emissions. 
The jurisdiction could place a fee on these emissions (or perhaps the 
emissions in excess of an expected or ideal baseline) and then use the fee to 
invest in infrastructure to encourage more walking and biking within the 
community in order to offset the emissions caused by increased motor vehicle 
traffic.  The jurisdiction might also be interested in applying the fee to energy 
efficiency programs in the jurisdiction in order to offset the emissions caused 
by energy use in the new building itself.  In either case, the use of a monetary 
exaction allows the jurisdiction to pool funds received from multiple projects 
to make broader infrastructure investments (like improved transit service) that 
benefit the community in ways that individual on-site mitigation projects 
could not.   
1.  Demonstrating an Essential Nexus for an Emissions Fee 
In contrast to exactions of land, development fees offer the flexibility 
to identify the most cost effective mitigation investments wherever they 
occur.  However, this flexibility may raise questions about whether a 
geographically distant mitigation project bears a strong enough nexus to the 
impact caused by the development (i.e., whether it is truly mitigating the 
                                                          
permit a robust give and take with applicants before reaching a final determination of necessary 
conditions, for example, by separating staff discussions with the applicant from agency decisions.  
 60.  See infra Part III. 
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harm imposed).  That said, GHG emissions may offer a clearer nexus 
between impact and mitigation activity than other measures currently used 
to calculate impact fees, even if the mitigation project occurs elsewhere in 
the jurisdiction. 
Planners are fairly comfortable imposing an impact fee on 
developments to fund transportation projects that will directly mitigate 
increased traffic caused by the development.61  The nexus analysis becomes 
more complicated if the transportation mitigation project occurs elsewhere 
in the jurisdiction and cannot be claimed to offset the specific traffic issues 
caused by the development.  That said, courts have been flexible with the 
scope of the nexus, as long as one can be demonstrated.  In Commercial 
Builders of Northern California v. City of Sacramento,62 the Ninth Circuit 
rejected a builder’s argument that an ordinance can only be upheld under 
Nollan if it can be shown that the development is directly responsible for 
the impact the exaction is designed to address.63  For a fee imposed to 
mitigate a development’s GHG emissions, the location of the mitigation 
project and the source of emissions reduced matter less than a fee based on 
infrastructure demand.  Because climate change is a global problem, and 
GHGs mix uniformly in the atmosphere, it makes little difference 
scientifically where emissions occur or from what type of source (e.g., 
carbon dioxide emissions from transportation are no different from those 
from buildings).64  Emissions increases in one part of town can be “offset” 
by emissions reductions elsewhere, without concern for the local public 
health impacts that more traditional pollutants can cause.65  In that sense, 
GHG emissions mitigation projects offset the direct impact of the 
development no matter where in the jurisdiction they occur, and arguably 
might not have to happen within the jurisdiction at all, although a 
community may prefer to invest locally.  
A local government provides a logical boundary within which to 
reduce net emissions.  As mentioned above, many communities have 
                                                          
 61.  NANCY W. VERBER, DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES: AN OVERVIEW (2004), 
http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/impactFeepres.pdf (listing roadway facilities as 
one of the “fee-eligible public facilities frequently named in state laws”). 
 62.  941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 63.  Id. at 875 (holding that when “a detailed study revealed a substantial connection between 
development and the problem to be addressed, the Ordinance does not suffer from the infirmities 
that the Supreme Court disapproved in Nollan”). 
 64.  A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW & DAVID HARRISON, JR., PEW CTR. ON 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 46 (2003), 
http://www.c2es.org/publications/emissions-trading-us-experience-lessons-and-considerations-
greenhouse-gases.  
 65.  Id. at 8. 
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already set jurisdiction-wide GHG emissions reduction goals.66  In these 
cases, the entity that would be imposing the fee (the local government) 
aligns with the geographic area in which mitigation strategies would occur, 
providing for a relatively straightforward administration of the program.  
There are also economic reasons to allow the mitigation to take place 
anywhere within the jurisdiction—it can be far more affordable to achieve 
GHG reductions across a wider geographic area than in a facility-by-facility 
manner.67  By pooling mitigation fees instead of requiring each developer to 
provide on-site mitigation, the jurisdiction can make the best use of funds 
by directing them to the most cost-effective reduction opportunities.  As 
long as the community identifies a governmental interest in reducing GHG 
emissions, something many jurisdictions have done through formal 
processes to develop Climate Action Plans,68 and provides assurances that 
fees collected will be spent to reduce emissions within the jurisdiction, the 
nexus test would seem to be satisfied.69 
2.  Demonstrating Rough Proportionality for an Emissions Fee 
The rough proportionality test asks whether exaction is related “both in 
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”70  In order to 
pass the rough proportionality test, local officials would have to show that 
approximately the same level of emissions would be reduced by the 
mitigation effort as would be increased by the development project.  
Conveniently, for GHG emissions, this is relatively easy to do. 
A strategy that quantified GHG emissions resulting from the traffic 
impacts of a development would most closely resemble the impact fees 
local governments currently impose.  However, there is no legal reason to 
limit the emissions analysis to the gases resulting from transportation, as 
long as a nexus can be shown between the mitigation strategy (the climate 
change impact of emissions from building energy use is identical to those 
from transportation) and the development.  Therefore, local officials might 
also calculate the contribution that the development makes to emissions 
                                                          
 66.  See, e.g., Local Examples of Climate Action, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www3.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/local/local-examples.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) 
(listing local jurisdictions that have created climate change action plans).  
 67.  ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at iii. 
 68.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 66.  
 69.  To demonstrate that the nexus is truly in place, it would likely be important for 
communities to isolate funds collected for a given impact so that they can be spent explicitly for 
mitigation purposes, rather than commingling the revenue with general funds that may or may not 
go to mitigation purposes.  VERBER, supra note 61 (listing segregated funds as a key element of 
state legislation enabling impact fees). 
 70.  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
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from its energy use or other sources.  Approaches to each of these are 
discussed below.71 
a.  Rough Proportionality: Transportation Emissions 
Planners talk about quantifying both the direct and indirect impacts of 
development.  While it may be hard to estimate the number of residents in a 
new development who would use a new bicycle lane (a direct impact), or to 
estimate the number of cyclists that would be necessary to mitigate the 
increased traffic congestion caused by a development (an indirect impact), 
it is relatively easy to quantify the GHG emissions associated with 
increased traffic, and even to estimate the reductions that could be achieved 
by investing in bicycling and walking infrastructure.  Planners already 
estimate the traffic impacts of new development in order to establish 
entirely uncontroversial development fees to improve road infrastructure.  
Travel demand forecasting models or sketch planning tools analyze the 
impacts of a given development project on the transportation system.72  In 
order to calculate the GHG emissions associated with that travel, the travel 
forecast can then be fed into a transportation GHG modeling tool.  A report 
prepared for the American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials recommends using MOVES, (the “Motor Vehicle 
Emissions Simulator”),73 a tool produced by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency—and already used nationwide to estimate emissions of 
other pollutants from transportation sources—for this purpose.74 
Traditional transportation impact fees use metrics like level of service 
(“LOS”), which identify the infrastructure service the local government will 
provide the community (e.g., X miles of road per capita), and then impose a 
fee on the development to cover the incremental infrastructure needed to 
maintain that LOS.75  Recently, some progressive jurisdictions have started 
                                                          
 71.  A topic deserving further research is the baseline that should be employed to calculate the 
GHG emission upon which the climate exaction should be calculated.  Of course, even the 
greenest new residential development will generate some emissions from transportation or energy 
use, and a climate conscious local government might want not to discourage any such 
development with a fee.  One might hypothesize that a climate exaction should be calculated only 
upon emissions in excess of an average building, or from transit-oriented development using 
current best practices for energy efficiency.  On the other hand, a rigorous land use policy may 
strive to discourage and mitigate all emissions that contribute to global warming. 
 72.  ICF CONSULTING, ASSESSMENT OF GREENHOUSE GAS ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES FOR 
TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS 21 (2006), 
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/NotesDocs/25-25(17)_FR.pdf.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING MOVES FOR ESTIMATING STATE AND LOCAL 
INVENTORIES OF ON-ROAD GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION 5 (2012), 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/stateresources/420b12068.pdf.  
 75.  PETER N. BROWN & GRAHAM LYONS, CITY ATTORNEYS DEPT., LEAGUE OF CAL. 
CITIES, A SHORT OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 7–9 (2003), http://www.ca-
ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/resources__overviewimpactfees.pdf. 
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to develop multi-modal LOSs in addition to automobile-focused LOSs.76  
However, using GHGs instead of some version of LOS might simplify the 
calculation and the legal analysis by providing a standard metric that 
applies to all development projects and mitigation efforts.77 
b.  Rough Proportionality: Nontransportation Emissions 
The prototypical development fee addresses a development’s impact on 
traffic.  However, if the concern is GHG emissions, any given development 
will also be responsible for emissions from its own energy use, and 
jurisdictions might consider requiring developers to offset these emissions as 
well.  There is precedent for development fees to support green building 
initiatives.  Arlington County, Virginia, imposes a fee on development 
projects to support the county’s green building educational fund; and Eagle 
County, Colorado rebates permit fees for residential projects that exceed 
green building standards, and they imposes additional fees on projects that do 
not.78  Professor Carl Circo has proposed greater use of this tool to promote 
energy efficient buildings, on the ground that green building projects “serve 
the public health and general welfare in the same way that environmental 
regulations do. “79  However, as with transportation, GHG emissions provide 
a way to use environmental regulation to achieve energy efficiency goals, and 
with an already standardized metric.  Conveniently, GHG emissions from 
building energy consumption are even easier to calculate than induced 
transportation emissions. 
In 2001, the World Resources Institute and the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development released the first edition of the 
“Greenhouse Gas Protocol,” an accounting framework that now serves as 
                                                          
 76.  Sarah Peters, Impact Fees for Complete Streets: A Comprehensive Project Submitted in 
Partial Satisfaction of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Urban Planning 3 (2012) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles), 
http://164.67.121.27/files/Lewis_Center/CompleteStreetsInitiative/Peters_report.pdf. 
 77.  The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) has recommended that California 
replace the LOS metric used for environmental impact analysis with vehicle miles traveled 
(“VMT”).  Letter from Amanda Eaken, Deputy Dir. Sustainable Communities, & Justin Horner, 
Policy Analyst, NRDC, to Christopher Calfee, Senior Counsel, Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Research (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/NRDC_LOS2-13.pdf.  As NRDC notes, 
VMT would better reflect the environmental impact of transportation, in much the same way that 
GHG emissions would.  Id.  GHG emissions, however, offer a metric that can be standardized 
across multiple emissions sources, rather than just transportation.  In addition, a VMT metric 
would not reflect the environmental benefit of driving more fuel efficient (or non-emitting) 
vehicles, while a GHG metric would.  On the other hand, VMT may be a more politically 
palatable choice than GHG emissions. 
 78.  Carl J. Circo, Should Owners and Developers of Low-Performance Buildings Pay Impact 
or Mitigation Fees to Finance Green Building Incentive Programs and Other Sustainable 
Development Initiatives?, 34 WM & MARY ENVTL. L.& POL’Y REV. 55, 73 (2009). 
 79.  Id. at 77. 
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the foundation for nearly every GHG standard and program in the world.80  
The GHG Protocol introduced the concept of different “scopes” of 
emissions.81  Scope 1 refers to direct emissions from a facility (e.g., from a 
building’s boiler or furnace, or from a vehicle used on-site).82  Scope 2 
refers to emissions from purchased electricity, heat, or steam produced off-
site (for example, emissions from the generation of electricity purchased by 
the building).83  Scope 3 refers to other “indirect” emissions, and would 
include the travel-demand-related emissions discussed above.84 
The transportation section above discussed methods for estimating 
these Scope 3 emissions,85 but Scopes 1 and 2 are actually far easier to 
calculate.  Scope 1 involves simply applying emissions factors to any fuels 
combusted on-site,86 information that is available in any building’s records 
and could be estimated for a new development based on comparable 
structures.  Scope 2 involves applying local or supplier-specific emissions 
factors to metered electricity consumption.87  These calculations are more 
straightforward than the travel demand forecasting done routinely by local 
jurisdictions trying to estimate road infrastructure needs.  To help 
jurisdictions and others establish a method for making and compiling these 
project-level calculations, the GHG Protocol produced a report focused on 
estimating reductions from projects (as opposed to emissions at a corporate 
or institutional level).88 
3.  Proposed Frameworks for Calculating an Emissions Fee 
The authors are not aware of any jurisdictions that have imposed a fee 
on a development project to mitigate its GHG emissions.  However, the 
consideration of a few alternative approaches suggests one potential 
methodology. 
It might be tempting for a jurisdiction to attempt to quantify the 
societal cost of GHG emissions, and then charge the developer this amount.  
The appeal of this approach is that it could truly internalize the full cost of 
the emissions released by a given development, often stated as the goal of 
                                                          
 80.  About the GHG Protocol, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, 
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp (last visited Dec. 16, 2015).  
 81.  GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, A CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 
STANDARD 25 (rev. ed. 2004), http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/public/ghg-protocol-
revised.pdf. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
 86.  GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, supra note 81, at 42. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, THE GHG PROTOCOL FOR PROJECT ACCOUNTING (2005), 
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/ghg_project_protocol.pdf.  
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development fees.89  Such estimates are used for other purposes, too.  For 
example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other federal 
agencies use a “social cost of carbon” to estimate the climate benefits of 
rulemakings.90  This amount is used to estimate the economic damages 
associated with a small increase in carbon dioxide emissions, as well as the 
benefit of a small decrease in emissions.91  It is intended to be a 
comprehensive figure, including among other impacts “changes in net 
agricultural productivity, human health, [and] property damages from 
increased flood risk.”92  Although the figure “very likely” underestimates 
the true damages caused by emissions,93 it would be hard to argue that the 
local jurisdiction bears all of these costs and therefore that there is a clear 
nexus between this level of fee and the local government interest harmed by 
the development.  For example, there may not be any agriculture in the 
community.  There is also considerable debate about what the appropriate 
level of the social cost of carbon should be, and the issue is very politically 
charged.94  For these reasons, while the social cost of carbon may be the 
right measure for nationwide emissions mitigation strategies, it may not be 
the best fit for calculating local development fees. 
An alternative approach would involve quantifying the emissions 
resulting from a given project and then identifying the local cost to achieve 
the same level of reduction.  Focusing on matching the level of emissions 
mitigation to the level of emissions increase avoids the challenging 
economic modeling exercise and maintains a clear nexus.  There may still 
be some uncertainty in the calculation: project costs may vary within the 
jurisdiction, or based on the size or type of project, and calculations will 
have to assume a baseline level of emissions that would have occurred in 
the absence of the project.  However, these baseline calculations are 
frequently made for local Climate Action Plans, and the fee must only be 
                                                          
 89.  See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) 
(“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of 
responsible land-use policy . . . .”). 
 90.  The Social Cost of Carbon, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 11, 2015), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html.  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 69 (2008), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf. 
 94.  In 2013, the White House revised the value it uses for the social cost of carbon and was 
met with political pushback from all sides.  Environmental groups argued the value was too low, 
and industry groups argued that the process was too opaque and the result too uncertain.  See, e.g., 
PETER HOWARD, OMITTED DAMAGES: WHAT’S MISSING FROM THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 
(2014), 
http://costofcarbon.org/files/Omitted_Damages_Whats_Missing_From_the_Social_Cost_of_Carb
on.pdf; Andrew Childers, Putting a Social Price on Carbon.  Is $37 a Ton Adequate?, 
BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & ENV’T BLOG (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.bna.com/putting-social-
price-b17179882522/. 
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roughly proportional (not a “precise mathematical calculation”).95  
Therefore, the fee does not have to match the cost of mitigation precisely, 
and this approach allows the jurisdiction to estimate a reasonable local cost 
and determine fees accordingly.  (To meet the requirement under Dolan that 
there be an “individualized determination,”96 jurisdictions should also 
ensure that even within the context of a broadly applied fee program, a 
process is available for review of individual cases.97) 
B.  Climate Exactions for Climate Adaptation 
In the adaptation context, a climate exaction could take multiple forms.  
Most simply, it could require that existing environmental impact fees take 
into account the effect that climate change will have on the relevant impact 
(for example, quantifying a project’s impact based on projections of future 
sea-level rise at the property site rather than using historical projections).  A 
more challenging but valuable version of this strategy would also quantify 
and mitigate any loss in adaptive capacity caused by the development, such 
as, for example, a project that made it harder for a wetland to migrate with 
rising sea levels. 
1.  Demonstrating Essential Nexus for an Adaptation Fee 
A mitigation fee approach is already used to require developers 
causing a loss of wetlands to mitigate the loss on- or off-site, and fees in 
lieu of mitigation may be imposed.98  This was, in fact, the type of 
monetary exaction at issue in Koontz—Mr. Koontz was given the option to 
improve wetlands off-site in exchange for permission to fill the wetlands 
property he proposed to develop.99  Adaptation to climate change is 
generally not currently the stated purpose for existing wetlands 
mitigation—the requirement comes from the Clean Water Act’s concern for 
the “integrity of the Nation’s waters”100 and from state wetlands laws—but 
one can imagine an additional rationale for the same program based on 
mitigating the loss of the community’s capacity to adapt to increased storm 
water.  While the Court found in Mr. Koontz’s favor, it was not because a 
local government may not impose a wetlands mitigation fee; rather, the 
                                                          
 95.  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  SARAH L. COFFIN, SERENA M. WILLIAMS & PAUL F. MUETHING III, CTR. FOR ENVTL. 
POL’Y & MGMT. ENVTL. FIN. CTR., MANAGING GROWTH WITH FAIRNESS: THE REGULATORY 
TAKINGS TEST OF SMART GROWTH POLICIES, PRACTICE GUIDE #2, at 12 (2002), 
https://louisville.edu/cepm/pg-2. 
 98.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-843-F-08-002, WETLANDS COMPENSATORY 
MITIGATION, http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
08/documents/compensatory_mitigation_factsheet.pdf.  
 99.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (2013). 
 100.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 98. 
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Court wanted the jurisdiction to go through the exercise of applying 
constitutional takings tests to the condition it imposed.101  The strategy is 
valid as long as this demonstration is made, and it is not hard to imagine 
jurisdictions applying a similar fee for other measures designed to maintain 
a community’s adaptive capacity by offsetting loss of capacity caused by a 
project with increased capacity close by.  Development that decreases a 
community’s resilience to climate change, for example, by removing 
shoreline protections from flooding or decreasing tree canopy that provides 
cooling, could be mitigated with activities elsewhere in the community that 
increase resilience to these impacts.  The nexus between the impact and the 
fee spent to offset the impact seems clear. 
2.  Demonstrating Rough Proportionality for an Adaptation Fee 
Quantifying a project’s impact to demonstrate that a fee is roughly 
proportional may be more challenging—adaptive measures raise additional 
complications regarding timing and uncertainty of future projections.  In 
California, the Coastal Commission already charges mitigation fees to 
offset the impacts of private seawalls on beaches.  For example, owners of 
the Ocean Harbor House Condominium in Monterey, California requested a 
permit to build a 585-foot seawall to protect the complex.102  As a condition 
of the permit, the Coastal Commission imposed a $2.15 million beach 
impact fee and dedication of public beach access through a parking lot in 
the complex.103  In this case, the Coastal Commission determined the 
amount of the beach fee by calculating the historical rate of erosion at the 
site, and the estimated recreational value of the beach that would be lost 
because of impacts to the beach caused by the seawall.104  The court upheld 
this fee, holding that it passed both the Nollan essential nexus test and the 
Dolan rough proportionality test.105 
In an adaptation context, however, regulators may need to reconsider 
how they calculate the beach fee in the following ways: 
(1) Erosion rates are likely to increase as sea levels rise, so regulators 
may need to project future erosion rates over the life of the project to 
adequately mitigate the impacts. 
(2) In addition to recreational benefits, beaches and natural shorelines 
provide important flood risk reduction benefits that will become 
                                                          
 101.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597–98. 
 102.  Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 
43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 103.  Id. at 439. 
 104.  Id. at 437. 
 105.  Id. at 450. 
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increasingly important to communities as the climate changes.106  These 
natural resources will be increasingly degraded over time as sea levels rise.  
Where we put development in the way, these resources will be unable to 
migrate inland and keep pace with rising seas and those will be gradually 
eroded and lost. 
Regulators should account for ways that climate change will affect the 
currently calculated impacts (e.g., recreation) of a development in the 
future, as well as how the project may exacerbate future risks of climate 
change impacts to neighboring properties.  As this example shows, rough 
proportionality for adaptation, (which is inherently forward-looking), may 
require more of a risk-mitigation analysis, which may be harder to calculate 
and monetize than GHG emissions are.  There is work to be done to 
improve current tools and methodologies—for example, regulators will 
need a scientifically sound analysis of how sea-level rise may affect erosion 
rates over time—but the science in these areas is constantly progressing, 
and unfortunately, we learn more about the value of avoiding risk each time 
we see more damage from storms and sea-level rise. In any event, the 
amount of an adaptation fee probably should be discounted to reflect that it 
addresses climate harms that will occur at an uncertain time in the future.  
Finally, as in the emissions discussion above, the requirement is only that 
the jurisdiction demonstrate rough proportionality, not a precise 
mathematical calculation. 
IV.  ADDRESSING CRITIQUES 
We can anticipate some concerns about our proposal for climate 
exactions.  An immediate objection may be that such exactions would 
unduly raise the costs of housing.  The economics of exactions are complex, 
but they do not always raise the cost of housing.  When the measure of an 
exaction is known to a developer before initiating a project, both logic and 
empirical evidence suggest that, in general, the landowners will bear the 
costs of the exaction because developers will pay the landowners less for 
their land.107  Lower prices for land may decrease the amount of land 
available for development.  But given that development of such a parcel 
will impose costs on all from GHG emissions or weakened resilience, it 
seems both efficient and fair for the exaction to discourage development of 
the site. 
In some circumstances, the costs of an exaction likely will be passed 
on to purchasers in the form of higher real estate prices.108  How one may 
                                                          
 106.  Florida recently enacted legislation authorizing local governments to consider sea-level 
rise in their coastal management planning.  FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3178 (West 2015).  
 107.  See Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL’Y 
DEV. & RES. 139, 153 (2005). 
 108.  See Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 211.  
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evaluate this should vary, depending on whether or not the expenditures 
made with the exacted funds benefit the specific site upon which the 
exaction is imposed.  If the expenditure does benefit the site, the higher 
price paid will be appropriate because the development will be more 
valuable due to the added public infrastructure.  Thus, for example, if the 
municipality funds a new zero-emission bus line to serve the burdened site, 
the value of a home on that site will increase along with its price.  However, 
if the municipality funds the bus line elsewhere within the jurisdiction, 
perhaps because it can serve more people there, then the cost of the 
burdened parcel will rise without any increase in value, discouraging 
development at that site.  But this seems justified (assuming that the 
expenditure choice was made for good reasons, such as too little density 
near the burdened site), because climate policy justifies discouraging 
development at a site that will create large new emissions.  Providing the 
bus line in the denser part of the jurisdiction will make land and existing 
housing there more valuable and may encourage new development where 
climate impacts will be less. 
Some may express concern that local governments are not the proper 
level of government to impose regulations directed at reducing GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles.  Of course, the federal government has 
exclusive authority to regulate emissions from motor vehicles, with the 
notable statutory exception for California, and co-regulates emissions from 
power plants along with the states.109  But local land use regulations do not 
regulate tailpipe or building emissions or gas mileage.  Rather, they are the 
chief tool available to reduce vehicle miles traveled, which has an obvious 
and independent effect on emissions.  Moreover, local governments possess 
the initiative for providing transportation alternatives to automobiles, 
through providing bicycle and pedestrian options and developing public 
transit (even if federal funding is often necessary), and they implement the 
building codes that drive the energy consumption of new buildings.  In 
addition, preparing for the impacts of climate change is an inherently local 
concern, as sea-level rise, increased storms, or urban heat will affect each 
jurisdiction according to its own location and presence of features to 
mitigate these effects. There seems to be no reasonable argument that 
climate exactions or other land use regulations aimed at reducing emissions 
or responding to the impacts of climate change are preempted by federal 
law.110  On the contrary, the Supreme Court has often stated that land use 
                                                          
 109.  42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7543 (2012). 
 110.  In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court held 
“that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right 
to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”  131 S. Ct. 
2527, 2537 (2011).  Although the Court did not address whether the Clean Air Act also preempts 
state claims based on GHG emissions, id. at 2540, other courts have held that it does not.  E.g., 
Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2013).  But even if the Clean Air 
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regulation is primarily entrusted to state and local governments and has 
even read federal authority narrowly to preserve local authority.111  
Similarly, the reality that climate change is a planetary problem, 
meaning that local emissions contribute to  harm globally, should not 
preclude local efforts to reduce local emissions.  Local emissions contribute 
to aggregate global emissions, which impose both global and local harms. 
Local governments have jurisdiction over local land development; no global 
entity can address emissions from such local development.  Climate 
exactions do not attempt to regulate any economic activity outside of the 
regulating jurisdiction; for example, they neither discriminate against nor 
burden interstate commerce.112   
Emissions reductions achieved by one local government can become 
pointless if  other localities continue to grow emissions at historic levels. 
Nonetheless, localities are the chief governments that can reduce emissions 
from land use patterns.  Fragmentation of land use authority is a familiar 
problem creating many inefficiencies; climate exactions would not pose a 
unique challenge.  Local government initiatives such as climate exactions 
may even lead to broader collaboration on difficult climate problems, 
because local governments motivated to address climate issues will not 
place themselves at a short-term comparative economic disadvantage if 
acting in concert with other localities.  In addition, coordination of climate 
land use regulations within metropolitan regions, among states, and even 
internationally could create a more efficient regulatory structure with 
greater benefits.  For example, concern about climate change has led to 
novel efforts among states and localities to coordinate land use and other 
policies to adapt to climate change and effect greater reductions of 
                                                          
Act does preempt state and federal tort claims against power plants, the scope of the Act’s 
preemption would not reach local land use regulations, because the Clean Air Act only preempts 
state action to the extent that the EPA is regulating at the national level.  Current EPA GHG 
regulations under the CAA address vehicle tailpipe emission rates and power plant emission rates, 
not land-use patterns that lead to greater use of fuels.  In contrast, other state actions have been 
expressly preempted by the Clean Air Act.  For example, states are prevented from adopting or 
attempting to enforce standards relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or 
new motor vehicle engines, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), although even in this case, the Act also explicitly 
allows the state of California to seek a waiver to this provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b), and allows 
other states to adopt California’s standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
 111.  See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 174 (2001) (finding that construction of Clean Water Act to permit federal jurisdiction over 
abandoned sand and gravel pit “would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional 
and primary power over land and water use”); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 
30, 44 (1994).  
 112.  Cf. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (finding that California low carbon fuel standard does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce).  
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GHGs.113  Successful climate policy measures often bubble up from lower 
levels of government rather than emerge from top down directives.114 
An environmentalist may complain that climate exactions are an 
inadequate response to climate problems because they permit new 
developments even when they exacerbate emissions and weaken resiliency 
so long as the developer can pay the fee.  But climate exactions achieve 
what economists have long advocated—putting a price on carbon.115  Thus, 
climate exactions should discourage developments where the welfare 
benefits from development fail to exceed the social costs of climate harms, 
so long as the costs of the new developments are accurately calculated—a 
serious issue, which we address below.  This balancing of costs and benefits 
is likely to be more politically sustainable than an outright prohibition of 
categories of development, because it acknowledges that other values 
sometimes will outweigh climate concerns.  Importantly, when 
development does occur, payment of the exaction will provide the 
government with funds that can be used to mitigate climate harms.  For 
example, a local government can spend the proceeds of a climate exaction 
on public transit, which can permanently reduce the community’s overall 
carbon emissions, or on coastal lands, permitting wetlands or beaches to 
migrate inland with sea-level rise. 
V.  CALIFORNIA: A COMPELLING CANDIDATE FOR CLIMATE EXACTIONS 
In addition to the constitutional permissibility of climate exactions, a 
key question is whether a jurisdiction has the legal and technical capacity to 
undertake this approach.  Some recent developments may enhance such 
capacity.  Environmental protection statutes at the state and federal level 
look likely to provide tools for a jurisdiction to impose a GHG mitigation 
fee.116  For example, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
requires all federal agencies to assess the environmental impacts of major 
                                                          
 113.  See, e.g., SOUTHEAST FLORIDA REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT, 
http://www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/; TRANSPORTATION AND CLIMATE INITIATIVE OF 
THE NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES, http://www.transportationandclimate.org (last 
visited Jan. 31. 2016).  
 114.  For example, efforts to enact comprehensive climate legislation in the U.S. Congress did 
not succeed, and current federal vehicle GHG standards build on standards established by 
California and followed by other states under § 177 of the Clean Air Act; likewise, the Clean 
Power Plan recently finalized by the EPA builds on existing state-level limits on emissions from 
power plants.  
 115.  In 1997, 2500 economists, including Kenneth Arrow, William Nordhaus, and Joseph 
Stigletz, endorsed a statement calling for a mechanism to put a price on carbon to address climate 
change. The Economists’ Statement on Climate Change, Redefining Progress, 
http://rprogress.org/publications/1997/econstatement.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).   
 116.  See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental Impact Review 
Process, 22 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Winter 2008, at 20, 24 (discussing the extent to which state and 
federal environmental reviews consider climate change in their analyses). 
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federal actions significantly affecting the environment,117 and this includes 
local transportation projects that receive federal funding or permits.118  In 
2010, the White House Council on Environmental Quality released draft 
guidance for incorporating GHG emissions and climate change impacts into 
the NEPA analysis and evaluating options for mitigating the impacts,119 
updated in 2014 to incorporate federal land and resource management 
activities.120  Their finalization would begin to standardize assessment of 
the emissions and climate impacts of federal (or federally funded) projects, 
and may give localities translatable tools for quantifying and mitigating 
emissions.  In addition, some state environmental policy acts also 
incorporate climate change explicitly,121 and perhaps these states are well 
suited to taking the first steps toward local development policies to reduce 
emissions. 
The State of California might be an excellent place to explore climate 
exactions, for a number of reasons.  First, California is one of the states 
with its own state-level environmental protection statute (the California 
Environmental Quality Act, or “CEQA”).122  CEQA does not independently 
authorize a jurisdiction to impose exactions on developers, but it does 
provide that: 
[a] lead agency for a project has authority to require feasible 
changes in any or all activities involved in the project in order to 
substantially lessen or avoid significant effects on the 
environment, consistent with applicable constitutional 
requirements such as the ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ 
standards established by case law.123   
Most importantly, in 2007, California passed legislation requiring the 
governor’s office to develop guidelines for the incorporation of GHGs into 
CEQA analyses.124  Regulations followed in 2009, and include a number of 
                                                          
 117.  National Envtl. Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2012).  
 118.  40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2015). 
 119.  Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 8046 (Feb. 18, 2010). 
 120.  COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, GUIDANCE: FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES ON 
CONSIDERATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
NEPA REVIEWS (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CEQ-2014-
0004-0001. 
 121.  EIA Guidelines for Assessing the Impact of a Project on Climate Change, SABIN CENTER 
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/nepa-and-
state-nepa-eis-resource-center/environmental-assessment-protocols-consideration-climate-
change#State Guidelines (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
 122.  See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–165 (West 2007). 
 123.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15041(a) (2015). 
 124.   S.B. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_97_bill_20070824_chaptered.pdf. 
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relevant provisions.125  California agencies must analyze the GHG 
emissions of proposed projects and reach a conclusion regarding the 
significance of those emissions.126  The analysis must include the project’s 
potential energy use, including transportation-related energy, and ways to 
reduce energy demand, including through the use of efficient transportation 
alternatives;127 agencies also must consider potential mitigation measures to 
reduce those emissions.128  Agencies may streamline the analysis by using a 
programmatic GHG emissions reduction plan.129  A GHG mitigation fee 
would be well aligned with this direction to consider mitigation measures, 
particularly if the fee were included in a local climate action plan, allowing 
for streamlining of the CEQA analysis.  Likewise, California’s Coastal 
Commission has led the way in attempts to mitigate the environmental 
impact of development on the coast, using strategies like monetary 
exactions, as with the beach impact fee example discussed above.130  
California has extensive experience with development impact fees, guided 
since 1987 by the state’s Mitigation Fee Act, which identifies the legal 
requirements of fees.131 
Second, California has a particularly acute local government funding 
challenge.  Proposition 13,132 enacted in 1978, drastically limited the property 
tax that local governments collect on properties, increasing jurisdictions’ 
dependence on other sources of revenue, including development fees.133  This 
leads the state to consider sources of revenue that others may not.  In 2014, 
California’s then-Senate majority leader proposed a carbon tax on 
transportation fuels,134 although he later shifted the proposal to focus instead 
on revenue from the state’s GHG cap-and-trade program.135  The GHG 
mitigation fee would create a new funding source for emissions reduction or 
climate adaptation projects. 
                                                          
 125.  CEQA and Climate Change, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RES., 
http://www.opr.ca.gov/s_ceqaandclimatechange.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).  
 126.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.4 (2015). 
 127.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, app. F. 
 128.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.4(c). 
 129.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15183.5(b). 
 130.  See supra Part III.D.3. 
 131.  See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66000–08 (West 2009). 
 132.  CAL. CONST. art. 13A. 
 133.  See, e.g., JEFFREY I. CHAPMAN, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., PROPOSITION 13: SOME 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 11 (1998) (discussing the “fiscalization of land use”), 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_998JCOP.pdf. 
 134.  Marc Lifsher, State Senate Leader Proposes ‘Carbon Tax’ on Motor Vehicle Fuels, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/20/business/la-fi-carbon-tax-proposal-
20140221.  
 135.  Steinberg Backs Off ‘Carbon Tax’, ABC 10 (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://www.news10.net/story/news/politics/2014/04/14/steinberg-backs-off-carbon-tax/7712703/.  
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Finally, California has already been a leader on the development of 
innovative laws and policies to address climate change.136  It is the first state in 
the country to enact a cap on GHGs across all sectors of the economy.137  It has 
also enacted a novel law known as S.B. 375, requiring the state to set regional 
targets for GHG reductions from passenger vehicles, and requiring 
metropolitan planning organizations to prepare a Sustainable Communities 
Strategy (“SCS”) as part of their Regional Transportation Plans.138  The SCS 
must be adequate to meet the GHG reduction targets, if implemented, but there 
is no requirement to implement the plans.139  There are, however, incentives to 
encourage implementation, for example, providing developers relief from 
CEQA requirements if the project is consistent with the SCS.140  S.B. 375 
could also provide a framework for establishing GHG mitigation fees—a 
jurisdiction interested in the approach could incorporate the strategy into its 
SCS.  The fee could, in turn, provide the mechanism to implement the plan and 
achieve the goals of S.B. 375, rather than stopping at the planning stage for lack 
of funding.  At the same time, the approach would offer developers a 
streamlined approval process, thanks to the incentives provided in the 
legislation. 
Another recently proposed state bill, S.B. 1, would have supported 
S.B. 375 by authorizing the creation of Sustainable Communities 
Investment Authorities and use of a strategy known as “tax increment 
financing” in defined Sustainable Communities Investment Areas.141  The 
bill passed both houses of the state legislature, but met with considerable 
political opposition that characterized the bill as an attempt by the state to 
take land use decisions away from local governments, or by local 
governments to vest too much power in the hands of unelected Authority 
members.142  Governor Brown did not sign the bill, and he vetoed a similar 
                                                          
 136. The political elements contributing to California’s strong support for policies addressing 
climate change are analyzed insightfully in Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Climate: 
Lessons for Climate Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 399 (2013).  
 137.  California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, A.B. 32, 2006 Leg., 2005-06 Sess. 
(Cal. 2006), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-
0050/ab_32_bill_20060927_chaptered.pdf.  For information on the Act’s primacy, see Lampert, 
supra note 32, at 193.   
 138.  Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008, S.B. 375, 2008 Leg., 
2007-08 Sess. (Cal. 2008), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0351-
0400/sb_375_bill_20080930_chaptered.pdf. 
 139.  Sustainable Communities, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/sb375.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Sustainable Communities Investment Authority Act, S.B. 1, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. 
(Cal. 2013), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB1. 
 142.  See, e.g., Stephen Frank, Senate Bill 1: Good Bye California Republic, Hello California 
‘Soviet Socialist’ Republic or the ‘CSSR’ for Short, AGENDA 21 RADIO (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://agenda21radio.com/?p=697; Lawrence J. McQuillan, Good News! SB 1 Dies (For Now), 
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version of the bill in 2012.143  Emissions mitigation fees would likely find 
their own political opposition just as S.B. 1 did, but they would remain in 
the hands of local officials and planners, which might make them more 
politically palatable than more state-driven approaches. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The imposition of fees on developers to mitigate GHG emissions 
offers several benefits to local governments concerned with meeting the 
Nollan and Dolan tests.  First, contrary to concerns that applying these tests 
to monetary exactions would be an excessive burden, it may actually be 
easier to apply these tests to monetary fees (which have an explicit value) 
than to physical dedications of property, whose value may be harder to 
calculate and demonstrate as roughly proportional.  Second, GHGs provide 
a convenient, consistent metric for which there are standard methodologies 
to calculate. Based on this analysis, there is no constitutional barrier to local 
governments imposing a fee on developments in order to mitigate GHG 
emissions.144  There may still be state-level restrictions or guidelines, as in 
California’s Mitigation Fee Act, and a fee enabling act may be required.  
However, that does not mean that other barriers do not exist—for example, 
political opposition to fees or support for increased local development may 
weigh against the policy. 
A.  Challenges 
In difficult economic times, jurisdictions are often wary of not being 
sufficiently welcoming of new development.  Rather than imposing new 
fees, some jurisdictions are waiving or deferring existing impact fees as an 
economic development strategy.145  Political inertia is a factor as well, and 
                                                          
INDEP. INST., THE BEACON (Sept. 25, 2013, 5:26 PM), 
http://blog.independent.org/2013/09/25/good-news-sb-1-dies-for-now/. 
 143.  Damien Newton, Gov. Brown Could Sign Bill to Help Finance Sustainable Development 
in CA, STREETSBLOG (Aug. 9, 2013), http://la.streetsblog.org/2013/08/09/gov-brown-could-
sign-bill-to-help-finance-sustainable-development-inca/. 
 144.  Another legal objection to climate exactions may be based on the judicial doctrine 
followed in some states that an expenditure of a monetary exaction must directly benefit the land 
charged for the impact fee.  See, e.g., Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 
2d 126 (Fla. 2000).  While these states apply the rule to impact fees for construction of public 
capital projects, they do not seem to apply the rule to monetary exactions designed to mitigate 
environmental harms.  Even if they did, climate exactions to mitigate emissions do directly benefit 
residents of the burdened development as much as other residents of the jurisdiction.  For 
exactions to address loss of adaptive resilience, however,  the analysis might be more complicated, 
requiring the adaptation measures to benefit the burdened residents, so that, for example, 
investments in berms or other living shorelines features to increase the community’s adaptive 
capacity would need to protect and serve the development, although not exclusively.   
 145.  See, e.g., Development Impact Fee Deferral Program, CITY OF ELK GROVE, 
http://www.elkgrovecity.org/city_hall/departments_divisions/economic_development/incentive_p
rograms/development_impact_fee_deferral_program (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
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the GHG mitigation fee idea is a relatively new one.  Others have proposed 
greater use of impact fees to deal with environmental problems,146 but the 
strategy is not in wide use, as it is for traffic mitigation.  In addition, climate 
change itself is controversial.  Although GHGs may provide a more 
transparent method for connecting new development to the need for 
alternative transportation infrastructure, it may be more expedient 
politically to stick with traffic impacts as the basis for the fee, if only to 
avoid a political battle over climate change. 
B.  Opportunities 
On the other hand, jurisdictions interested in adopting strategies to 
address GHG emissions should consider a mitigation fee placed on new 
development.  It provides a source of funding for implementation of climate 
goals, and ties the cost for any given development only to the impact of that 
specific development.  The funding aspect of this strategy is worth 
additional emphasis—to the extent that state and federal gasoline taxes fund 
transportation projects, those sources of funds are already inadequate to 
meet spending obligations,147 and will decline even further if climate 
change policies reduce GHG emissions by decreasing fuel consumption.148  
Transportation departments are searching for alternative sources of revenue, 
but many of these (e.g., a fee on vehicle miles traveled) are also politically 
challenging.149  A GHG mitigation fee would put the power to manage 
GHGs—and to pay for them—in the hands of local governments. 
There is no question that society must find a way to reduce GHG 
emissions in order to lessen the impact of climate change, and that engagement 
by all levels of government will be necessary.  While federal and state 
governments may be best suited to address emissions from power plants or 
regulate vehicle fuel economy, land use strategies will have to be implemented 
at the local level, as they always are.  There is good reason to get started on 
these strategies quickly: the latest report on mitigation measures from the 
                                                          
 146.  See, e.g., James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Market Based Approaches 
to Environmental Preservation: To Environmental Mitigation Fees and Beyond, 43 NAT. RES. J. 
837, 846 (2003). 
 147.  CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND AND THE TREATMENT OF SURFACE 
TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET 5 (2014), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/45416-
TransportationScoring.pdf. 
 148.  See, e.g., Pacyniak et al., Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transportation: 
Opportunities in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER 15 (2015). 
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/www.georgetownclimate.org/files/GCC-
Reducing_GHG_Emissions_from_Transportation-11.24.15.pdf. 
 149.  Road Pricing Defined: Vehicle-Miles Traveled (VMT) Fees, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. 
HIGHWAY ADMIN., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908002219/https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/revenue/road_pricin
g/defined/vmt.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).  
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes that “[i]nfrastructure 
developments and long-lived products that lock societies into GHG-intensive 
emissions pathways may be difficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the 
importance of early action for ambitious mitigation.”150  Fortunately, some 
local jurisdictions are taking it upon themselves to establish GHG emissions 
reduction goals and plans to achieve them.151  One option for achieving 
these goals might be the adoption of a GHG mitigation fee on new 
developments, and the approach is both legally and technically viable. 
Given the Koontz decision, the safest approach for a jurisdiction is to 
design a fee program that applies to developers broadly rather than ad hoc, 
as well as to meet the Nollan and Dolan tests.  This approach should be 
workable in the case of GHG emissions mitigation given the availability of 
standardized quantification tools and methodologies.  Framing the fee in the 
context of a comprehensive climate plan or goal can help ground the 
strategy in terms of the government’s interest, and in the case of California, 
can both support compliance with and streamline review under statewide 
environmental statutes. 
Jurisdictions that may have struggled to justify transportation impact 
fees based on other metrics may find that applying a GHG emissions lens to 
the analysis reveals both an essential nexus and a rough proportionality that 
might otherwise be difficult to demonstrate.  However, political challenges 
with a fee explicitly based on GHGs may argue against such an approach, 
and as other travel metrics become more widely used, it may be easier to 
avoid the explicit climate change discussion.  Nevertheless, some 
jurisdictions welcome that discussion—some, particularly those in 
California, are even required to have it.  For these communities interested in 
being first, a GHG mitigation fee may offer a viable strategy to address 
emissions reductions in local land use decisionmaking. 
                                                          
 150.  IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 18 (2014), 
http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_approved.pdf.  
 151.  See, e.g., C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/cities (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).  
